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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Ramiro R. Navarez appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to robbery. On appeal, he challenges the denial of his
motion to suppress and the denial of his motion for funds to retain an expert.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedinqs
At approximately 1:00 a.m. on October 27, 2006, two men robbed the
Maverick store located on Scott Avenue in Rupert. (4116107 Tr., p. 26, Ls. 6-7,
22-23.) An "all call" went out to law enforcement. (4116107 Tr., p. 26, L. 19.) The
dispatcher advised that there were two suspects, one of whom had a weapon;
that they were wearing hooded sweatshirts, stocking caps, and bandannas; and
that they left the store on foot. (4116107 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 19-24.)

Sheriff's Deputy

Joe Moore heard the "all call" and began driving toward Rupert from Paul.
(4116107 Tr., p. 29, L. 14.)
On the drive from Paul to Rupert, Deputy Moore observed two or three
cars traveling in the opposite direction, but the occupants did not match the
description of the robbers supplied by dispatch. (4116107 Tr., p. 30, Ls. 8-9, 12.)
As Deputy Moore approached the Stimpy's convenience store (4116107
Tr., p. 30, Ls. 22-25, p.31, Ls. 1-2), he could see another car approaching from
the opposite direction, so he slowed down in order to make use of the well-lit
area (4/16/07 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 10-13).

On approach, the other car was only

traveling 42 mph in a 55 mph zone. (4116107 Tr., p. 31, Ls. 5-6; p. 34, Ls. 7-8.)
Deputy Moore testified that, using the light from Stimpy's to get a better look, he

observed that the car was occupied by four Hispanic males, all with shaved
heads, and sitting in the "low rider" position. (4116107 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 10-13; p.35,
Ls. 2-7; p. 37, Ls. 4-6; p. 47, Ls. 5-8.) Officer Moore further testified that he
continued to observe the vehicle in his rear view mirror after the two cars passed.

(4116107 Tr., p. 36, Ls. 14-24; p. 37, Ls. 14-17; p. 38, Ls. 14-19.) The occupants
appeared to act suspiciously to Deputy Moore because they were making "furtive
movements," and he could see that all four occupants turned to look at him.

(4116107 Tr., p. 36, Ls. 16-17; p. 37, Ls. 14-17; p. 38, Ls. 14-22; p. 43, Ls. 20-25.)
Moore turned around and followed the vehicle back toward Paul. (4116107
Tr., p. 38, L. 25 - p.31, L.1.) Moore observed that the vehicle was being driven
carefully at a speed below the limit; that the car's occupants appeared to be
making "furtive movements" and appeared to be nervous; that the driver always
used his turn signal when changing lanes or turning corners; and that often the
signal was turned on well in advance of the lane change or turn, all of which
Moore interpreted as an exaggerated effort to obey all traffic rules and avoid
suspicion, but which only served to increase the officer's suspicion. (4116107 Tr.,

p. 31, Ls. 5-11, 21-25; p. 32, Ls. 14-20; p. 42, Ls. 9-18; p. 43, Ls. 20-25; p. 45,
Ls. 7-11, 19-25; p. 46, Ls. 1-4.)
Moore pulled the car over after following it to Paul because, based on his
training and experience, the behavior of the driver and other occupants was
suspicious. (4116107 Tr., p. 43, Ls. 2-8, 16-25.) Deputy Moore also recalled being
told by dispatch that the suspects were Hispanic (4116107 Tr., p. 28, Ls. 2-22),
and he believed that he observed that the occupants of the car were Hispanic

(4116107 Tr., p. 43, Ls. 23-25).

In addition, the car was traveling within a

reasonable proximity to the time and place of the robbery. (4116107 Tr., p. 79, Ls.

3-6.) Moore stated that when he approached the car, the driver (Navarez)
appeared calm, but the three passengers were acting nervous. (R., p. 26, para

15.) Moore saw that two of the occupants matched the description of the
robbers, and that there were hooded sweatshirts, stocking caps, and bandannas
in plain view in the car.

(R., p. 26, paras 13-14.) Moore detained all four

occupants of the vehicle and seized the vehicle as evidence. (R., p. 27, para

23.)
The State charged Navarez with robbery and sentencing enhancements
for using a gun in the commission of a crime and for criminal activity associated
with any gang or gang member (R., pp. 61-67, 72-74). Navarez moved to
suppress evidence obtained from the tragic stop. (R., pp. 70-71 .) He also made
a motion for funds to hire an expert to rebut Deputy Moore's anticipated
testimony as to the visual observations he made before stopping Navarez's car.

(R., pp. 104-05.) The district court denied both motions. (R., pp. 131-38, 14142.)
Navarez entered a conditional guilty plea and reserved the right to appeal
the denial of his suppression motion and motion for expert funds. (R., pp. 171-

76.) The sentencing enhancement charges were dismissed. The court accepted
Navarez's guilty plea (R., p. 172), and imposed a unified sentence of 25 years,
with seven years fixed, followed by 18 years indeterminate, and retained
jurisdiction (R., pp. 188-95).

Navarez filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment. (R., pp. 198-

ISSUES
Navarez states the issues on appeal as follows:
1.

Was it fundamentally unfair and thus a violation of Mr. Navarez's
constitutional and statutory rights for the district court to deprive him of the
expert services required to present an adequate defense?

2.

Was there a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the occupants of
the car were the robbers of the store when they did not match the
description other than by their ethnicity?

(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)
The State rephrases the issues on appeal as follows:
1.

Has Navarez failed to show error in the denial of his motion to suppress?

2.
Has Navarez failed to show that he was deprived of his constitutional and
statutory rights when the district court denied him funds for certain expert
services?

ARGUMENT
I.
Navarez Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Supmess
Introduction

A.

Navarez challenges the denial of his motion to suppress arguing, as he
did below, that Deputy Moore did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion
to stop Navarez's vehicle. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14.) Application of the law to
the facts supports the district court's order denying Navarez's motion to
suppress.
B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, a

bifurcated standard is applied. State v. Butcher, 137 ldaho 125, 129, 44 P.3d
1180, 1184 (Ct. App. 2002), rev. denied (2002) (citing State v. Abeyta, 131 ldaho
704, 708, 963 P.2d 387, 391 (Ct. App. 1998)). The appellate court defers to the
lower court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial and competent
evidence in the record, and freely reviews the application of constitutional
principles to the facts as found.

Id.

The determination of whether a search is

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law over which the
appellate court exercises free review. Butcher, 137 ldaho at 129, 44 P.3d at
1184 (citing State v. Mclntee, 124 ldaho 803, 804, 864 P.2d 641, 642 (Ct. App.
1993)).

C.

The District Court Correctlv Concluded, Based On The Totality Of The
Circumstances, That The Traffic Stop Was Supported Bv Reasonable
Articulable Suspicion
A warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable unless it

falls within certain special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant
requirement. State v. Butcher, 137 ldaho 125, 129, 44 P.3d 1180, 1184 (Ct. App.
2002) (citations omitted). A warrantless stop is justified if there is a reasonable
and articulable suspicion that an individual either has or is going to commit a
crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). A traffic stop is considered to be a
seizure. State v. Gutierrez, 137 ldaho 647, 650, 51 P.3d 461, 464 (Ct. App.
2002). The district court correctly concluded that the stop in this case was
constitutionally reasonable because, by the time Deputy Moore followed it back
to Paul, he had developed, based on all of the circumstances, a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the individuals in the car might have committed the
armed robbery of the Maverick station. State v. Butcher, 137 ldaho 125, 129, 44
P.3d 1180, 1184 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and
Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)).
In another case also involving a warrantless stop, State v. Butcher, 137
ldaho 125, 44 P.3d 1180 (Ct. App. 2002), the defendant was convicted of first
degree murder, and appealed the district court's pretrial ruling denying his motion
to suppress. At 4:00 a.m., Butcher and another man had broken into the home of
Blake Morgan and shot three rounds into his head and neck. Butcher, 137 ldaho
at 128, 44 P.2d at 1183. The two men fled in a grey two-toned van, as observed
by a neighbor drawn to his window by the sound of gunshots.

Id.

A few days later, a Twin Falls police officer stopped a van matching the

description of the vehicle used in an immediately preceding armed robbery (and
the murder). Butcher, 137 ldaho at 129-30, 44 P.3d at 1184-85. The officer saw
firearms in plain view in the van, including a nine-millimeter pistol.

a. This led to

the detention and arrest of Butcher and his co-defendant because they were
perceived to be dangerous and there was reasonable suspicion to believe that
they had been involved in the robbery.
Butcher made a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence that resulted
from the stop, namely the weapons and especially the pistol. The court held that
the officer was justified in conducting a

stop because the officer had a

reasonable suspicion that a serious felony had been committed by the occupants
of the van based on information he was provided, the officer observed that the
two persons in the van matched the description given to him, and the van was
the only vehicle in the vicinity at 1.47 a.m. Butcher, 137 Idaho at 130, 44 P.3d at
1185.
Similarly here, Deputy Moore developed a reasonable articulable
suspicion to make the stop because the dispatcher indicated that the victim of the
robbery reported that it was committed by two Hispanic males, and Deputy
Moore observed what he thought to be Hispanic males in the car he followed.
He also knew that the robbery had occurred around 1:00 a.m. and that, coming
from a small town like Rupert with only a few exits, it would be reasonable to
expect that the robbers might be traveling out of Rupert on the road that leads to
Paul at that time of night. (4116107 Tr., p. 44, Ls. 18-21; p.47, Ls. 16-25; p. 59,

Ls. 16-25.) Deputy Moore also testified that included in his reasons for stopping
the car was that the people inside the vehicle showed a "keen" interest in him as
an officer and, further, that "there was furtive movement inside the vehicle once
they had seen it was a police officer's vehicle. . . ." (4/16/07 Tr., p. 43, Ls. 1624.)

Based on the totality of these factors, the district court was correct in

concluding that the motion to suppress should be denied because these facts
and observations by Deputy Moore gave rise to a reasonable, articulable
suspicion.
In a case relied upon by the district court in this case, State v. Gascon,
119 Idaho 932, 812 P.2d 239 (1991), the court found that, based on a brief
description of a robber, the police were justified in setting up a roadblock and
observing passing motorists, looking for one that matched the suspect's
description.

When Gascon's car passed through the roadblock, the police

thought the driver was acting suspiciously and the car was stopped. Under the
seat, the police saw a baseball cap protruding.

Upon removing the hat, the

officer found a jacket, notes, and a bag of money. Gascon was charged with
robbery and his motion to suppress the evidence found in the car was denied.
The appellate court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress.
The Navarez's argument that Deputy Moore somehow did not have a
reasonable articulabie suspicion is not supported by the record. (Appellant's
Brief, p. 12; 4116107 Tr., p. 43, Ls. 16-25.) Deputy Moore testified that his
suspicion was aroused because the people in the car showed an interest in him
as an officer; there was "furtive movement" in the car; and the occupants

appeared to be Hispanic, as described in the "all call." Interestingly enough,
(citing Gascon,

Navarez also cited State v. Butcher,

a),
but he does

not distinguish the circumstances that exist here from the circumstances in
Butcher, where the court approved the traffic stop and detention. Butcher is a
case that, factually, parallels the instant case on the issues of the stop and
search. The outcome in Butcher, where the trial court denied the defendant's
motion to suppress based on similar circumstances as in this case, does not
support Navarez's arguments, especially where Navarez does not make a
distinction between the instant case and the rulings in Butcher and Gascon,

supra.
The district court correctly applied the law to the facts in concluding that
Deputy Moore, having observed four persons matching the general description of
the suspects in the car at that late hour and in that vicinity, he was justified in
conducting a Tern/ stop and detaining the occupants. State v. Butcher, 137
Idaho 125,44 P.3d 1180,1185 (Ct. App. 2002). Navarez has failed to show any
basis for reversal of the denial of his motion to suppress.
II.
Navarez Failed To Show That He Was Deorived Of His Constitutional Riqhts In
The Denial Of Funds To Hire An Expert
A.

Introduction
Navarez requested funds to hire a spatial and visual expert. Navarez

anticipated that the expert's testimony would refute Deputy Moore's testimony
about what Moore was able to observe in the dark on the evening of the robbery

relative to Navarez's car and its occupants. The district court denied Navarez's
motion, ruling that the expert's testimony would not assist the trier of fact.
Navarez challenges the denial of his motion for funds to hire an expert
witness at state expense arguing, as he did below, that the district court denied
him "fundamental fairness as embodied in the Due Process and Equal Protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as his right to present evidence
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment." (Appellant's brief, p. 4.) Navarez has failed
to show either an abuse of discretion or a violation of his constitutional rights.
B.

Standard Of Review
Before authorizing the expenditure of public funds in an indigent's

defense, the trial court must determine whether the funds are necessary in the
interest of justice. State v. Olin, 103 ldaho 391, 396, 648 P.2d 203, 207 (1982)
(citing State v. Powers, 96 ldaho 833, 838, 537 P.2d 1369, 1374 (1975)). This
determination is within the discretion of the trial court, and a denial of a request
for investigative services will not be disturbed absent a showing that the trial
court abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion would occur if the court
rendered a decision which is clearly erroneous and unsupported by the
circumstances. State v. Olin, 103 ldaho 391, 396, 648 P.2d 203, 207 (1982).

C.

Aa~licationOf The Law To The Facts Shows That Navarez Was Not
Deprived Of His Constitutional Rishts In The Denial Of Funds To Hire An

Exoert

Navarez requested funds to hire an expert pursuant to ldaho Code
Section 19-852(a)(2), to retain the services of Marc Green, PhD. (R., pp. 10416.) Dr. Green's expertise is as a spatial and visual expert and Navarez wanted

to hire him to challenge the observations made by Deputy Moore under the
conditions that existed the night of the traffic stop. Navarez contended that
Deputy Moore's observations were "highly suspect" and that Dr. Green would
testify about what in fact could have been and what was or was not observed by
Deputy Moore. (319107 Tr., p. 6, L. 17 - p. 8, L. 11.) However, the district court
questioned whether Dr. Green's testimony would assist the trier of fact. The
prosecutor stated that, "I don't believe that this expert's testimony will in any way
assist the trier of fact in determining what's relevant as to a reasonable suspicion
in this case." (319107 Tr. p. II,Ls. 20-23.) The district court agreed, ruling:
The accuracy of the deputy's statements about what
he observed at night while the vehicles were passing
each other and then through his rearview mirror after
the vehicles had passed can, if necessary to decide
this case, be determined by the court without the
assistance of an expert witness. It is the fact finder's
function to judge the credibility of witnesses. (citations
omitted) The court finds that the denial of the
services of an expert witness at this stage of the
proceedings will not deny the defendant of the
fundamental fairness required by the due process
clause. Therefore, an expenditure of funds for that
purpose is not necessary in the interest of justice.
(R., p. 137.) Contrary to Navarez's assertions on appeal, the district court acted
well within its discretion in denying Navarez's motion.
The Constitution does not require a state to provide expert or investigative
assistance merely because a defendant requests it. State v. Lovelace, 140
ldaho 53, 65, 909 P.3d 278, 290 (20b3), (citing State v. Olin, 103 ldaho 391, 648
P.2d 203 (1982)) (additional citations omitted). A defendant's request for expert
or investigative services should be reviewed in light of all circumstances and

measured against the standard of "fundamental fairness" embodied in the due
process clause. Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 65, 278 P.3d at 290 (citations omitted).
It is clear from the record that, in ruling on Navarez's motion for funds to
retain an expert, the district court took into account the fundamental fairness
required by the due process clause, and the circumstances of the case. The
Court concluded that the expert requested by Navarez would not aid the court as
the trier of fact, but rather it was a matter of weighing Deputy Moore's testimony
as the trier of fact. Navarez failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the
district court's ruling and, as such, the ruling should not be disturbed.

CONCLUSION
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon Navarez's guilty plea to robbery.
Dated this 8th day of October 2008.
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